The tug "VB Rönnebeck" was actually supposed to ensure safety on 28 August 2023. As a traffic safety vessel, it was monitoring the Nordperd roadstead off the coast of Rügen, where two LNG tankers were anchored. As the sailing yacht "Schöner Wohnen" approached the area, the tug steered towards it - at almost ten knots. The yacht's skipper saw an engine-powered vessel on a collision course. She did not realise that it was a safety vessel. The situation escalated: both ships manoeuvred, both tried to avoid each other. In the end, they collided anyway. Dhe Federal Bureau of Maritime Casualty Investigation (BSU) investigated the incident and comes to a clear conclusion: the problem lies in the system.
One ship, two tasks, no labelling
The tugboat "VB Rönnebeck" was deployed on behalf of Deutsche ReGas GmbH & Co. KGaA. The Nordperd roadstead is located on the eastern side of the island of Rügen, south-east of the bay "Prorer Wiek" near Sassnitz, where the terminal has an annual regasification capacity of up to 13.5 billion cubic metres of natural gas. Two LNG tankers were anchored there in a packet, for which a safety distance of one nautical mile was prescribed.
The tug fulfilled two functions on this day: It was on standby as an assistance tug and at the same time monitored the area around the tankers as a traffic safety vehicle (VSF). The problem: from the outside, it was impossible to recognise which role it was currently performing. No special labelling, no conspicuous lights. For the skipper of the "Schöner Wohnen", the "VB Rönnebeck" was simply an engine-powered vessel - and therefore obliged to take evasive action in accordance with the collision prevention regulations.
Five minutes until the collision - without a word
The sailing yacht was travelling the roadstead under sail in a south-westerly wind of force three to four, gusting to six Beaufort on a south-easterly course at around five to six knots. Her VHF radio was switched on - on channel 16, the international call and emergency channel. From a distance of around 500 metres, the captain of the tugboat suspected that the yacht would not keep a safe distance. He accelerated to ten knots and headed towards the pleasure craft.
According to the skipper, it took about five minutes for the tugboat to get close enough for her to make eye contact with the crew on the bridge. She expected an evasive manoeuvre - in vain. There was no radio call via channel 16. There were no sound signals. No warning, no indication of the safety zone. The skipper's hand signals were only answered with a wave from the tug bridge.
According to his own statement, the tug captain approached the yacht to within 8 to 10 metres on a parallel course. Only then did he attempt to make contact by calling out from his bridge - in order to continue communicating via VHF channel 13. Not via channel 16, on which the yacht was listening.
When the distance became too small, the yacht tried to evade by turning to starboard. The tugboat also changed course to starboard. The vessels collided. Only after the collision did the tug captain verbally call over to the yacht and ask her to change to channel 13. Only then did the first radio contact take place.
The system has failed
The BSU comes to a clear judgement: the accident was not the result of a single error, but the result of several interacting factors. Particularly critical:
Lack of recognisability: In Germany, traffic safety vehicles are not required to be externally marked as such. The Directorate-General for Waterways and Shipping (GDWS) only considers labelling to be necessary if the deployment takes "longer" - for cost reasons. The BSU considers this to be wrong: "The decisive decision criterion for labelling a VSF should be the risk analysis."
Problematic intercept course: The tug approached in such a way that the yacht perceived a collision course. The BSU criticises: "If necessary, VSFs must be able to carry out suitable interception courses that rule out a collision at all times."
No communication: Until the collision there was no VHF radio contact, no sound signals, no warning. The yacht was listening on channel 16 and the tug captain could have reached her. He did not try. Instead, he sailed towards the yacht, approached to within a few metres and only then tried to make contact by calling from the bridge. The BSU states: "The lack of or delay in communication contributed to the fact that the vessel commands involved were unable to recognise the actual intentions of the other vessel."
Ignorance of the traffic regulations: The skipper of the sailing yacht was aware that LNG tankers must be sailed around at a safe distance. However, she was not aware of the specific general order for the Nordperd roadstead. Although her radio was switched on, it did not have a dual-watch function - it could only listen to one channel. The hourly situation reports from the Warnemünde traffic centre were announced on channel 16, but broadcast on working channels 9 and 13. She could not hear them. Nor did she know that a traffic safety vehicle was in operation there. And even if she had: The yacht did not have technical equipment such as AIS or radar to determine the exact distance to the anchor berth.
This might also interest you:
Evasion rules and right of way: sailors need to know these rules - When does "leeward before windward" apply? What does the "manoeuvre of the last moment" mean? Compact overview of manoeuvring obligations
Recognise the risk of collision correctly: Standing bearing - When is there a risk of collision and how do you react correctly? Practical instructions for taking a standing bearing
Maritime radio for sailors: Radioing correctly without "over and out" - How do you use the radio correctly? Which channels are important and when? Practical guide to radio communication at sea
BSU calls for uniform standards
The investigating authority is now making clear recommendations. Addressed to the Federal Ministry of Transport, it demands:
- A uniform labelling requirement for road safety vehicles in the national area of application and
- the introduction of internationally harmonised regulations, ideally in the Collision Prevention Regulations (CPR).
The BSU demands the GDWS:
- A further development of the existing principles for better recognisability,
- standardised procedures for establishing contact at an early stage (radio communication, safety messages, attention signals) and
- Instruction and training standards for skippers who perform traffic safety tasks.
Specifically, the BSU proposes A yellow common mode light that is clearly distinguishable from the signals prescribed in the COLREGs, as well as legible "Guard Vessel" labelling on both sides of the vessel. The example shows: The labelling could be done cost-effectively with printed tarpaulins that can be attached and removed quickly if necessary.
Not a new problem, but a more urgent one
But the problem is not new. Traffic safety vessels are used by the waterway and shipping authorities for all traffic safety measures - but so far mainly on inland waterways, where the traffic situation is more manageable.
The increasing utilisation of maritime space by wind turbines, LNG terminals and other critical infrastructures makes the use of VSFs more and more necessary. The legal and organisational framework conditions have not kept pace with this development.
The lack of labelling of road safety vehicles is not an isolated problem. It is an example of a development in which operational safety measures are being introduced faster than the associated standards.
The aim of a marine casualty investigation is to comprehensively describe and analyse the accident with the aim of preventing future accidents, explains the BSU. In the case of the Nordperd roadstead, the authority has fulfilled this mandate: The investigation report not only identifies the direct causes of the accident, but also uncovers systemic weaknesses.
Whether the recommendations are implemented is now up to the responsible authorities and legislators. Until then, traffic safety vessels will remain what they were in the case of the "VB RÖNNEBECK": Ships with a safety mission that are not recognisable as such to others.
Ursula Meer
Redakteurin Panorama und Reise
