Whether it’s the Vendée Globe, the Golden Globe Race, the Newport–Bermuda race or a private ocean crossing: if a yacht gets into distress far out at sea, a professional rescue unit is often unable to reach the scene in time. In such cases, sailors must rescue one another. A new report by the Cruising Club of America examines 28 such incidents – including the rescue of Kevin Escoffier by Jean Le Cam and Kirsten Neuschäfer’s rescue of Tapio Lehtinen. The analysis reveals which decisions save lives and why the journey from the life raft to the rescue yacht is often the most dangerous part of the entire operation.
When sailors have to rescue one another
“When you’re involved in this sort of sailing, you know that the cavalry doesn’t always come to the rescue. So, when you have the chance, you try to be the cavalry yourself.”
The quote comes from Rob McAlpine, skipper of the yacht ‘Sparky’. In 2015, his crew came to the aid of the ‘Restive’, which had become unmanoeuvrable and was in distress in the western North Atlantic. Following the Marion–Bermuda Race, the yacht was on its way back from Bermuda to the US east coast, in the middle of the Gulf Stream and around 142 nautical miles from the nearest land.
McAlpine’s statement also sums up what the new “Report of the Yacht-to-Yacht Crew Rescue Review Team” According to the Cruising Club of America, this refers to situations in which sailors cannot wait for professional sea-rescue services, but must rescue one another.
The report, published in October 2026, examines 28 documented cases in which the crew of a sailing yacht in distress were taken aboard another private yacht. Most of these incidents occurred far beyond the reach of land-based rescue services. Some, however, took place surprisingly close to the coast – because the boats in distress were sinking so quickly that only a yacht that happened to be nearby was able to come to their aid in time.
The key insight is therefore this: a yacht-to-yacht rescue is not some exotic scenario that only affects solo sailors in the Southern Ocean. It can affect regatta crews just as much as cruising sailors on an ocean crossing – and, under certain circumstances, even near the coast.
Kirsten Neuschäfer: “There are things I wish I’d known beforehand”
The foreword to the report is by Kirsten Neuschäfer, Winner of the 2022 Golden Globe Race. During this round-the-world sailing voyage she rescued her rival, Tapio Lehtinen, from his life raft.
Lehtinen’s “Asteria”, a Gaia 36, sank around 450 nautical miles south-east of South Africa. He was woken by a loud bang and, shortly afterwards, found himself knee-deep in water. There wasn’t much time: Lehtinen activated his distress signals, grabbed the most important equipment and jumped into the life raft. Neuschäfer sailed ‘Minnehaha’ around 100 nautical miles to his position.
The rescue was a success – but that is precisely why this case warrants critical reflection. Neuschäfer describes how difficult it was to find the small life raft in the swell. The low-set sun was blinding them. The orange-coloured island and even a signal blanket being waved were barely visible. One of the flares was accidentally fired into the water; the second remained out of their sight.
A orange smoke signal It would have been much more helpful during the day. Lehtinen also found that the emergency kit was missing a spare pair of reading glasses. Without them, he found it difficult to read the small displays on his satellite communication device and the instructions on the signalling devices.
They may seem like minor details. Yet it is precisely these that can determine whether a rescue proceeds swiftly and in an organised manner, or whether valuable time is lost. Neuschäfer therefore explicitly states that there were aspects of her successful rescue that she would have liked to have known about beforehand. Her foreword gives the account a personal perspective: this is not merely the judgement of a prominent offshore sailor, but of a skipper who herself spent hours searching for a barely visible life raft and subsequently took someone on board.
Rescuers and those rescued during the Vendée Globe
Hardly any other regatta has seen as many spectacular rescue operations as the Vendée Globe. The most recent and arguably best-known incident took place in 2020: Kevin Escoffier’s IMOCA ‘PRB’ broke apart around 840 nautical miles south-west of Cape Town and sank within a few minutes.
Escoffier managed to send a brief distress message and make his way to the life raft. Following a coordinated search lasting around eleven hours, Jean Le Cam spotted the faint glow of the raft in the night and Escoffier filmed it from the rear of his ‘Yes We Cam!’.
The remarkable twist in this story is that, eleven years earlier, Le Cam himself had been the one rescued. During the 2008/09 Vendée Globe, his ‘VM Matériaux’ lost its keel west of Cape Horn and capsized. Vincent Riou found Le Cam clinging to the upturned hull and pulled him aboard his ‘PRB’. However, during the rescue manoeuvre, Riou’s own boat was so badly damaged that he was later forced to retire. The man who was rescued in 2009 became the rescuer in 2020.
Other Vendée skippers also came to the aid of their competitors. In 1996, the Briton Peter Goss sailed around 180 nautical miles back into a severe storm to rescue the Frenchman Raphaël Dinelli from a life raft. In 1999, Giovanni Soldini rescued Isabelle Autissier from her capsized ‘PRB’. As Soldini was not sure whether she was still inside the upturned hull, he threw a hammer against it to signal his arrival.
A similar incident occurred in 2006 during the Velux 5 Oceans. When the keel mechanism on Alex Thomson’s “Hugo Boss” failed in the Southern Ocean, Mike Golding sailed “Ecover” back against the wind and waves for several hours. It took four attempts to pick Thomson up via the liferaft. Just six hours after the successful rescue, “Ecover” itself lost its mast.
It is precisely these cases that show just how fine the line can be between the rescuer and the person in need of help. Anyone undertaking a rescue may, under certain circumstances, push their own boat and crew to their limits.
28 cases – and almost every time, disaster loomed
For the first time, the report systematically categorises both the spectacular and the lesser-known incidents. Of the 28 cases analysed, 23 – or 82 per cent – were linked to a vessel that was sinking or in immediate danger of sinking. In eight instances, the hull had been damaged; in seven cases, there was a structural failure. In six instances, the keel or keel structure was affected.
The accidents investigated span various sea areas and sailing disciplines. A large proportion occurred during international offshore regattas and rallies. Others involved cruising yachts on private ocean crossings.
One of the Australian examples is the ‘Koomooloo’, built in 1968. It took part in the Sydney–Hobart Race In 2006, around 70 nautical miles off the coast, the boat began taking on water rapidly following a violent impact. The Australian crew initially battled the flooding with pumps and buckets. Around 40 minutes after the Mayday call, the ‘Adventure’ – which was also taking part in the race – arrived and rescued the eight sailors using a life raft.
Also during the Sydney–Hobart Race, the Australian yacht “Georgia” sank after its rudder shaft broke. Water quickly poured in through the resulting hole. In winds of 25 to 30 knots and waves four to six feet high, the crew of the “Merit” brought all 14 sailors on board in two controlled manoeuvres using the same liferaft.
In the Atlantic, the Newport–Bermuda Race and the return voyages from Bermuda in particular provided several case studies. During the 2024 race, the US yacht ‘Alliance’ collided with an unknown object at night, lost control and was flooded due to extensive damage to the hull. The entire nine-strong crew transferred to the ‘Ceilidh’, which was also taking part in the race. The ‘Alliance’ sank shortly afterwards.
The American yacht “Gunga Din” had to be abandoned during the same race following structural damage beneath the mast base. The seven-strong crew transferred to “Desna”, which then set course for Bermuda.
In 2015, the crew of the American wooden yacht ‘Restive’ were picked up by ‘Sparky’ in the Gulf Stream whilst returning from the Marion–Bermuda Race. The upper rudder bearing had come loose, and the rudder shaft, moving uncontrollably, was in danger of splitting the hull.
In 2019, the American Santa Cruz 70 ‘OEX’ found itself in distress during the Transpac race from California to Hawaii after the upper rudder bearing had come loose from its mounting. Around 360 nautical miles off the Californian coast, the nearby ‘Pyewacket’ took the crew on board. It withdrew from the race and returned to Southern California with both crews.
At Atlantic Rally for Cruisers Several further incidents occurred. In 2021, on the Hanse 588 ‘Charlotte Jane III’, first one and then the second steering system failed. In four-metre-high seas The crew had to transfer to the ‘Magic Dragon’ via a life raft.
In 2024, the Leopard catamaran “Karolina Viking” About 300 nautical miles west of Cape Verde, the sea was rough. The crew of the “Cinderella di Sanremo” waited until daylight to carry out the rescue and took the crew on board following a carefully planned approach. Starlink and a message in a WhatsApp group for the rally had previously been crucial in relaying the position of the stricken yacht.
Not all incidents were linked to a regatta. In 2024, the Arcona 460 ‘IdaLina’ was on a private Pacific crossing with two crew members. After the rudder shaft broke at the upper bearing, its uncontrolled movements also destroyed the lower bearing. The ingress of water could no longer be stopped. The crew got into the liferaft and were picked up by the Bavaria 45 “Pacific Wind”. “IdaLina” sank.
In 2023, the American Peterson 44 ‘Raindancer’ was en route from the Galápagos Islands to the Marquesas when it collided with a whale and sank within about 15 minutes. The four-person crew used an EPIRB, a SPOT tracker, Iridium communications and a VHF handheld radio. Both a merchant vessel alerted via the AMVER system and the catamaran ‘Rolling Stones’ reached the scene. The shipwrecked crew decided to transfer to the catamaran.
The investigation also covers accidents that occurred closer to the coast. In 2005, the yacht ‘Megawat’ sank whilst crossing the Irish Sea from Dublin to Scotland after the rudder shaft broke. Its life raft failed to deploy. The three crew members were eventually rescued with the help of the inflatable dinghy from the yacht ‘Quite Correct’.
The examples show that the causes are recurring: collisions, damage to the rudder, keel and structural failure, or a problem that went unnoticed at first Water ingress. What appears to be a minor technical fault can escalate into an existential threat within minutes.
The most difficult part often only begins once you’re in the life raft
In 19 of the 28 cases examined, the Transfer via a life raft. It is therefore the most important link between a stricken yacht and a lifeboat – but by no means a simple means of transport.
An inflated offshore liferaft is fitted with ballast bags and a drift anchor. It is precisely these features that ensure it does not capsize or drift away. At the same time, it is surprisingly difficult to manoeuvre. Several crews reported that, even with their combined efforts, they were unable to pull a manned life raft up against the ship’s side. It was only by using a winch that they managed to bring it alongside.
Furthermore, the island reacts differently to the waves than the yacht does. Whilst the boat rolls and pitches, the island remains comparatively stable in the water. This results in high, jerky loads on the mooring lines. At the same time, loose lines, the drift anchor or the painter must not get caught in the propeller.
The crew of the ‘Cinderella di Sanremo’ summed up the problem following the rescue of the crew of the ‘Karolina Viking’: although the crew members had learnt how to deploy and board a liferaft during their numerous sailing and safety training sessions, However, nobody had taught them how a sailing yacht picks up an occupied liferaft. It is precisely this gap that the CCA report aims to close.
Plan first, then act
One of the most important recommendations sounds simple, but is easily overlooked in practice: no rescue operation should begin until the skippers of both yachts have agreed on a joint plan and explained it to their crews.
The first step is to clarify where and when the liferaft is to be deployed, and on which side it should move away from the stricken yacht. Both skippers must know from which direction the lifeboat is approaching, whether the people being rescued will board amidships or via the stern, and which lines should be used to secure the raft.
Equally important is the allocation of roles: who will maintain radio contact, who will steer, who will operate the winch, who will secure the liferaft, and who will help the individual crew members board? Any unnecessary lines and other potential obstacles must be cleared away from the lifeboat. Everyone on deck should be secured, the boom must be lashed down, and the designated boarding point must be prepared.
Equipment must also be checked before leaving the boat. The crew should know whether there is enough water, food, clothing and medical equipment on the rescue yacht. Waterproofs, medication, spectacles, communication devices and important personal documents must, if possible, be ready and to hand before boarding the rescue yacht. Anything left behind on the sinking yacht is usually lost.
Just how important this coordination is was demonstrated by the fate of the ‘Gunga Din’ in the 2024 Newport–Bermuda Race. Cracks had developed in the hull beneath the mast base. The pumps managed to keep the water under control for a time, but the ingress of water increased whilst the yacht was underway. Furthermore, it was clear that the batteries would no longer be able to supply the pumps with sufficient power at night.
The crew therefore took advantage of a favourable window of opportunity: daylight, moderate seas and the rescue yacht ‘Desna’ on site. The decision to abandon the boat was understandable and had been taken in good time.
However, the actual handover between the two crews had not been fully co-ordinated. The crew of the ‘Desna’ were taken by surprise when the liferaft was deployed and, by their own account, felt they had to improvise. The rescue was successful, but it was less orderly than it would have been had a procedure been developed jointly beforehand.
The report therefore recommends that, once the decision to abandon the boat has been taken, the skipper of the rescue vessel should, as a rule, take charge of operations. Only he can assess how his boat is manoeuvring and where it is possible to take the survivors on board. The skipper of the stricken yacht remains responsible for his crew, ensures discipline in the liferaft and maintains communication with the rescue boat.
A reconnaissance trip, keeping a safe distance, can help you assess the movement of the liferaft, the state of the sea and any potential hazards in the water. It often takes several attempts. It is crucial to abort a failed attempt in good time, rather than forcing the yacht onto the liferaft.
A boat can suddenly carry twice as many people
The rescue is not over once the boat has been boarded. This is particularly evident from the case of ‘Alliance’ during the 2024 Newport–Bermuda Race.
The yacht collided with an unknown object during the night, lost control and was flooded due to a large leak. The entire crew was taken aboard the ‘Ceilidh’. There were subsequently 16 people on board the yacht, which was only about twelve metres long – seven members of the original crew and nine people who had been rescued.
It took a further 52 hours to reach Bermuda. Some of those involved later described this period as extremely stressful. The extra weight put a strain on the boat, the sails and the running rigging. In addition, three of the four fixing bolts on the upper rudder bearing mount broke. The crew were able to secure the bearing provisionally. A particular problem was that there was only one life raft on board, designed for ten people.
Drawing on such experiences, the report sets out specific questions for the period following a rescue: How are the injured, Hypothermic Or looking after people in shock? Will water and food be enough? How will the watch rota be organised? Where will the extra people sleep? What tasks will they be allowed to carry out? Will the rescue equipment last for both crews? And will they have to head for the nearest port straight away?
Responsibility now clearly lies with the skipper of the lifeboat. He decides on the course, the watch rota and the allocation of duties. The skipper of the rescued yacht should continue to lead his crew, but must follow the instructions given on the lifeboat.
Added to this is the psychological strain. Someone who has just lost their boat may appear calm and capable of acting immediately after being rescued. However, shock, exhaustion and grief may only become apparent later on. That is why the report explicitly calls for an emotional assessment of those rescued, in addition to a medical one.
What to put in your first-aid kit
The cases examined have revealed some surprisingly practical implications. An emergency kit should contain more than just an EPIRB, a handheld radio, water and signalling devices. The report also lists spare batteries, personal medication, spectacles and, if possible, a spare pair of spectacles, waterproof clothing, passports, a knife, a throw line and torches. Smoke signals can make it considerably easier to be located during the day. It is also advisable to carry an AIS-capable personal distress beacon and, for regattas where the equipment is provided, a satellite-based tracking and communication device.
Several crews forgot their oilskins, of all things, when leaving their yacht. This later became a serious problem when those who had been rescued were forced to remain on deck for hours or even days on an overcrowded boat. In one instance, even toothbrushes were sorely missed – a trivial matter, but one that sticks in the memory.
The case of the ‘Elusive’ also illustrates how basic equipment details can influence a rescue. On their return journey from the Newport–Bermuda Race, two crew members were due to swim over to the yacht ‘Yankee Girl’. Their lifejackets did not have crotch straps and slipped over their shoulders in the water. As a result, the two were unable to grab hold of the line that had been thrown out LifeSling They were unable to board as planned. They had to hold on to the rope and were eventually hoisted on board using a rope attached to their safety harnesses. A shark was spotted nearby after the rescue.
The report therefore strongly advises against planning a transfer whilst afloat. Where possible, the two yachts should also avoid coming alongside each other directly: the rigging, hulls and people on board could be seriously damaged at sea. Despite its pitfalls, the liferaft usually remains the better option.
It is also important to take the portable emergency transmitters and communication devices with you when you are rescued from the liferaft. If an active EPIRB or PLB is left behind in an abandoned liferaft, the authorities or other vessels might assume that another emergency is taking place and put themselves in unnecessary danger.
Who is behind the report – and what is its intended purpose?
The report is published and organised by the Cruising Club of America (CCA), in collaboration with US Sailing and the Bermuda Race Foundation. The CCA is an association of particularly experienced ocean sailors. Its Safety & Seamanship Committee focuses on practical safety work, accident analysis and the promotion of good seamanship.
The project was chaired by William Strassberg, a doctor and offshore sailor who heads the CCA’s Safety and Seamanship Committee. Operational management of the review team was in the hands of Ernest ‘Ernie’ Godshalk, a long-standing offshore sailor and former chair of the committee. The team also included Safety-at-Sea instructors, regatta organisers, experts in rescue equipment and sailors who had themselves been involved in yacht-to-yacht rescues. International members from the UK and Australia were brought in to ensure that the investigation was not conducted solely from an American perspective.
The team researched well-known cases, analysed official investigation reports, regatta documentation and media reports, and contacted 21 major offshore regattas and rallies. In around a quarter of the cases, the skippers or crew members of the yachts involved were also interviewed.
The study arose primarily from the debriefings following several serious incidents during the 2024 Newport–Bermuda Race. These revealed a gap in training: whilst ‘Safety at Sea’ courses do cover abandoning a sinking boat and boarding a life raft, However, how a small sailing yacht locates, approaches and secures a fully occupied liferaft and brings its occupants on board has, until now, hardly been taught systematically. Another catalyst was an accident during the CIC Normandy Channel Race in May 2025. In November 2025, the CCA finally established the Yacht-to-Yacht Crew Rescue Review Team.
The report is explicitly intended to be practical. Its findings are intended to be incorporated into Safety at Sea courses, regatta instructions, Station duties and the preparation of train crews be taken into account. The report does not prescribe any rigid rescue procedure – boats, weather, sea conditions and the nature of the damage vary too greatly for that.
Instead, he breaks the procedure down into five recurring phases: first, the communication, position and condition of the stricken yacht must be established. Both crews then prepare their boats for the rescue and agree on a joint plan. This is followed by the crew leaving the yacht and the rescue boat approaching, the actual boarding of the crew, and finally the provision of medical, psychological and logistical care for those rescued.
A report on successful rescues – with one caveat
The authors themselves point out the limitations of their study. Sufficient information was available for 28 cases. In all 28 cases, the rescue was successful and no one lost their life. Cases in which an attempt at a yacht-to-yacht rescue failed could not be adequately documented.
On the one hand, this is encouraging; on the other, however, it leads to a bias in the data: the report focuses primarily on what works in successful rescues or on instances where things nearly went wrong. It cannot provide comprehensive statistics on how often people die before help arrives or on how often rescue attempts fail.
Its value therefore lies not in a universal solution for distress at sea, but in the sum of specific experiences. Recurring patterns become apparent: Raise the alarm early; use multiple channels of communication, clearly communicate your own position, do not stay on the sinking boat until the very last minute, do not cut the liferaft loose too hastily and, above all, talk to one another before the manoeuvre begins.
Seamanship begins before the Mayday call
Perhaps the most important message in the report concerns not the technology, but the attitude. Good seamanship is not just about getting one’s own boat safely across the ocean. It also encompasses the ability to respond to a distress call – without putting one’s own crew at unnecessary risk.
Virtually none of the crews surveyed had practised a full yacht-to-yacht rescue. However, many of those involved reported that General Safety at Sea Training played a crucial role. Anyone familiar with life rafts, radio communication, safety harnesses and emergency reels can also, in a an unfamiliar situation act in a more structured manner.
At sea, professional help does not always arrive in time. In such cases, preparation, communication and sound seamanship determine whether a dangerous rescue operation will succeed.
Webinar tip: Further information on preparing for emergencies is available in the YACHT webinar on safety equipment on board.
Book recommendations
Everything’s fine, K. Kirsten Neuschäfer recounts her journey from the early days of her sailing career to her victory in the Golden Globe Race. Her account also includes the rescue of her fellow sailor, Tapio Lehtinen, in the Indian Ocean. The book complements the analysis of maritime emergencies with the personal perspective of a skipper who was directly involved. It focuses on the challenges of solo sailing and her experiences during her round-the-world voyage.
Sailing safely at sea, published by the Schoenicke Skipperteam, covers risk management and rescue manoeuvres as well as the use of digital tools and their limitations. Further chapters are devoted to potential problems with the on-board electrical system, rigging and engine. A supplementary crew handbook containing checklists and guidance on emergency procedures is available for download. The practical relevance of the report lies in the preparation it facilitates: procedures and equipment can be checked before a crew is forced to act under time pressure.
Ursula Meer
Redakteurin Panorama und Reise