Mr Frostad, you have introduced a new format in the Volvo Ocean Race, the main change being the single class. What is your interim conclusion after the first legs?
A key argument in favour of the single class was cost reduction. And it is already clear how well the concept is working. Logistics is a great example, it is so much more efficient than before. During the stopover in Cape Town, we completed the technical service for the entire fleet within five days! Eleven hours per boat, then it was back in the water. We used to hire cranes for long periods of time and they had to be on standby all the time because each team needed different amounts of time for repairs and maintenance. Now, one shipyard crew works for everyone, so the processes can be organised much better. This saves a lot of time and money. This is also thanks to the single class, and I am very glad that we have gone down this path.
In retrospect, was there an alternative to this path?
The alternative would have been: more expensive, more expensive, more and more expensive. And that would have meant the creeping death of the race. There was no other option. But we managed to get seven yachts to the start in what is still a very difficult economic climate for such events. I'm really happy with that.
And apart from the cost discussion?
In sporting terms, we have received excellent feedback from the teams. The sailors really like the single class.
The finale of the second leg was a real showdown, with just 16 minutes separating the winner and the runner-up after 23 days at sea ...
... that was incredibly exciting, yes, but for me there is something even more important in this context. The standardised class has changed the discussions. Sailors used to constantly talk about what their constructor or sail designer had delivered, about luck or bad luck with the material. Today, sailing performance is the dominant topic. I really like that.
The race centre in Alicante controls all the information. But the reporting does not always live up to the announcements of a kind of media revolution.
Technically, it's now on a completely different level. We are also getting very positive feedback. But it's in the nature of things that you can't please everyone. Hardcore sailors, for example, will miss insider stories about boat technology or the like. We are pursuing a clear strategy: the stories should tell more about the people and their lives on board.
The story of the race so far has been the "Vestas Wind" accident. Can you take anything positive away from it? After all, it has generated worldwide publicity and confirmed the race motto "Life at the Extreme".
I've also heard that the accident was good for publicity. But I don't think so. Not at all! Believe me, I would have gladly done without this kind of publicity. I'm really sad that this accident happened and I sympathise with the sailors. The accident has once again emphasised the magnitude of the challenge. Hey, we're talking about a race around the world! Of course, there are always risks involved. Above all, because it involves sailing in regions that are much more difficult to sail in than, say, the Bay of Kiel. Collisions are always possible. But this one is special, of course. It is indeed different whether you collide with a whale or a container or with an island. Especially if it is known and mapped.
Human error - those responsible for navigation have admitted the mistake.
And our task now is to learn from this mistake. That is why an independent commission, i.e. not acting on our behalf, will investigate how this accident came about. What circumstances and actions led to it? It didn't just happen, there is a history.
Which is?
I don't want to pre-empt the results of the investigation. Just this much: I believe that we will gain insights from this analysis that will benefit the whole of ocean sailing.
A little more specific, please.
I have spoken to everyone involved but, as I said, I don't want to draw any private conclusions at this stage. Questions beyond the admission of guilt need to be clarified first. Okay, they admitted that they didn't zoom far enough into the electronic chart on the "Vestas Wind" - but did they plan the leg on a paper chart before the start? That's where the reef is marked. And on the way: did they only use the electronic chart? Which map did they use, when and how? Things like that. It will be analysed very closely how people navigate in ocean racing these days. I'm pretty sure that the report will reveal findings that will lead to changes in ocean racing.
In the rulebook?
Possibly. Or as far as the focus in preparation and at sea is concerned - perhaps different priorities need to be set there.
What else does the accident teach?
We will also investigate very thoroughly what happened to the boat during the accident. The damage will give us clues as to whether we could have done this or that better in terms of construction, design and equipment. And we will also be able to derive recommendations for action from the processes in the hours before and after the accident. However, it is clear that human error can never be ruled out. Perfect aeroplanes with perfect pilots have already crashed - despite all preventive measures, there will always be such incidents.
Can cruising sailors learn any lessons from the operating error of the electronic chart?
Not only them, but also the manufacturers. The problem starts with the fact that more and more people who lack an understanding of the element are taking to the water with the help of this technology. For them, water sports are like driving a car. And the plotter is their sat nav. They enter their destination, the computer tells them the course and off they go. Just like driving a car from Kiel to Rostock. But this is generally true: even veteran sailors today rely on electronic navigation without realising its limitations.
Which one do you mean?
I grew up in Norway and sailed a lot in regattas. There are thousands and thousands of stones under water in my home area. Then I was once sailing in the same area on a yacht with a plotter. It was incredible: I changed the scale a little and the stones suddenly disappeared! But I knew they were there. That was a strange feeling.
How can the problem be avoided?
Better training. I believe there is still a lack of information among many sailors. They need to be better educated on how to make the most of the possibilities and also the pitfalls of on-board electronics. In my opinion, the manufacturers also have a duty in this respect.
In what way?
For me, there is no question that a warning must appear when approaching a potential hazard, for example if an unsuitable scale is used on the map in a risky area. This should be reasonably easy to programme. It also works in car sat navs. A separate display appears at every junction, showing the details in large format, and an arrow points the way. Such an effort is made there, although the dangers are much lower: When driving a car, a mistake can, at worst, lead you down the wrong path; when sailing, it can cost lives. There is still a lot of room for development in on-board electronics. But on all sides. Sure, you can ask: Are the electronics good enough? But you can also ask: Is the sailor good enough?
Back to the "Vestas" case. Is the wreck really to be refloated, as rumoured?
We are working with Vestas, the insurance company and a salvage company to get the boat off the reef. The findings of this salvage operation will determine whether and how we proceed.
How do you assess the situation?
The hull and the attachments are probably so badly damaged that it will be very, very difficult to repair them. If it can be done at all. But perhaps the deck, for example, can still be reused? Then it might be possible to build a new boat from it with reasonable effort. That really is a realistic scenario, it could work.
The odds are said to be fifty-fifty.
With the best will in the world, I can't say for sure. We first need to know exactly how extensive the damage is. And then everyone involved will consider together how to proceed.
